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SHOULD PUBLIC EDUCATION BE A FEDERAL FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT?

I. INTRODUCTION

Education is not a commodity the State provides. Strictly speaking,
education of one sort or another will happen, with or without any adult
involvement, and in many ways and places having nothing to do with
formal schooling. The subjects traditionally viewed as necessary to
successful intellectual development (e.g. the three R's, history, science,
the arts, etc.) can be considered boring by young humans (and some
adults) and require discipline to learn, so we create schools where these
elements of education are taught in an organized and measurable
curriculum. This kind of formal education provides individuals
intellectual development and the chance for future economic
opportunity, thus fostering societal stability. 1 The State's concern is that
the education, which inevitably happens, be of such a quality as to create
responsible citizens. Therefore, the State provides resources in the form
of money, facilities, teachers, regulations, etc., designed to ensure this
result. These governmental provisions constitute public education.
But is it only governmental self-interest that motivates the existence
of public education? Or is public education a right belonging to citizens
who may demand it of the government? Is it a "fundamental right" such
that it should be supervised and administered by state and federal courts?
About twenty years ago the U.S. Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez2 refused to recognize a
fundamental federal right to public education. 3 Until recently the point
seemed closed. However, the Court's recent approach to rights in
Lawrence v. Texas 4 may re-open the debate on the federalleveU State
courts historically have followed a more flexible approach, often finding a

1. See Thomas ). Walsh, Education as a Fundamental Right under the United States
Constitution, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 279 (1993).
2. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

3.
4.
5.
using the

Id. at 2.
539 U.S. 558 (2003 ).
Id. at 578-79 (For a discussion of the fundamentality of implicit constitutional rights
autonomy approach see infra Section II(C)(i), notes 31-38).
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fundamental right to public education under state constitutions."
Both the federal and the state approaches have problems: the handsoff approach of the federal courts may seem to devalue education, while
the hands-on approaches of the states may involve too much judicial
intervention, thus enmeshing the state judiciaries in questions of
educational and social policy they are not well suited to decide. Much of
this judicial wrangling over the definition or existence of a fundamental
right to education deflects attention from the practical concern, i.e.
whether the federal government or the state governments should fund,
provide, and superintend public education. After examining the varying
approaches to this question, this paper concludes that the best approach,
considering federalism issues, the competencies of the judiciary, and an
appropriate emphasis on the importance of education, is for the federal
judiciary to find that there is a right to some basic level of education, and
for the states to determine and enforce this level.
Section II of this paper discusses definitions of "public education"
and "rights," and the basic outlines of constitutional analysis surrounding
these issues. Section III discusses the early development of U.S. public
education and how federal courts have dealt with questions regarding a
right to education, and Section IV outlines the state court approaches
after Rodriguez. Finally, Section V outlines the possibilities for a
constitutional basis for a federal right to education, in light of the
practical questions of which level of government is best suited to make
educational policy decisions, provide educational resources, and
otherwise supervise public education.
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

"Public education" and "fundamental rights" must be clearly defined
when discussing whether public education is a federal fundamental or
constitutional right. The dictionary provides some definitions for these
terms, but they have become terms of art that only tangentially relate to
their everyday meaning. The characterization and definitions of these
rights become critical in constitutional analysis. 7 Though all men are
created equal, not all rights are; only fundamental rights are afforded the
greatest of constitutional protections. There are two general approaches
to determine if a right in question is fundamental. The first emphasizes
the experience of history and tradition, while the second emphasizes the

6. See infra Section IV.
7. See infra Section II(B), (C)(i) (discussing constitutional analysis offundamental rights).
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importance of individual autonomy. 8

A. Public Education
The traditional American definition of public education is three-fold:
(l) the government provides an education (2) free to the pupils and (3)
funded through public money. 9 Generally, such public funds come from
local property taxes as well as state and federal tax revenues. 10 These
funding issues are the basis of the equal protection litigation in which the
issue of education as a fundamental interest arises. 11
The State is not the only provider of education. Private, parochial
and home schools fulfill individual and societal educational needs. There
are also other funding structures, such as charter schools or voucher
systems, which blend the natures of public and private education. 12
While recognizing the positive addition these venues provide to the
fabric of the U.S. educational landscape, this paper focuses solely on
whether creating or defining a federal fundamental right to education is
proper. In particular, the focus is whether U.S. citizens have the right to
demand a free education, thereby putting the federal government under a
duty to provide such.
B. Fundamental Rights

A right is something "which is proper under law, morality, or ethics
[and] ... that is due to a person by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral
principle." 13 There are several different theories of rights, including
natural law, positivism, and fundamental rights theories. Each theory
emphasizes differences in the sources and effects of rights.
Natural law and positivism are a dichotomous pair in rights theory.
According to the natural law view, rights and laws derive from the nature
of the universe and exist independently of our knowledge of them. We
discover what these rights are through correct reasoning. Natural law
theory is closely tied to morality. For example, if a law exists which

8. See infra Section II(C)(i) (discussing history and autonomy approaches in determining
fundamental rights).
9. See Stephen R. Goldstein, E. Gordon Gee & Phillip T.K. Daniel, Law and Public Education,
15 (3d ed., Michie L. Publishers 1995).
I 0. joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a Change in Attitudes, 34
Harv. C:iv. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 547, 551 {1999).
II. Td. at 547-48.
12. See Phillip E. johnson, School Vouchers and the United States Constitution, in The SchoolChoice Controversy: What is Constitutional, 51, 51-65 (James W. Skillen ed., Baker Books 1993)
(discussing the constitutionality of voucher systems).
13. Black's Law Dictionary 1322 (Bryan A. Garnered., 7th ed., West 1999).
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violates the natural law then it is a wrong law, though it may still be legal.
A natural right is an ability to act in a particular area. This ability to act is
inherent in the individual regardless of what anyone else says or does.
Government is in violation of natural law when it restricts its citizens'
abilities to act in these areas. Natural rights are not entitlements that
require government action in order to be realized; rather, the citizens are
the primary actors and government is to refrain from acting as much as
possible.
The Constitution was written in a time when natural law theories
were dominant, and so the rights enumerated in the Constitution are
classic examples of natural rights. At that time, government was viewed
as an oppressor. After all, the Colonies had recently rebelled against the
"lawful" government of the British Crown. The Constitution and the Bill
of Rights were therefore set up to divide and limit government power to
allow people enjoyment of their inalienable rights to life, liberty and
property. Other natural rights include free speech, free exercise of
religion, protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, protection
from self-incrimination, and protection from the government taking
property without just compensation. The rights enumerated in the
Constitution are not entitlements provided by the government as much
as descriptions of the way things ought to be.
In contrast, positive law theory declares that laws and rights are
creations of the government, and come from nowhere else. Without
government action, there is no law or right. 14 Law is a creation of man.
This theory is therefore somewhat divorced from moral considerations,
inasmuch as when the government does create a law, its morality or
immorality does not affect its status as a law. 15 The decision-making
power and the corresponding ability to act lie with the government, not
the citizen; the government permits or mandates the citizens to act.
Under the positivist view of the Constitution, the government is not
an oppressor, but the provider. The government creates and enforces
laws and rights that regulate humans so that there is order or happiness
or justice. These views are generally tied to utilitarian and pragmatic
principles. Positive rights are those rights that entitle "a person to have
another [i.e. the government] do some act for the benefit of the person
entitled." 16 Examples of positive rights include welfare rights, social
security rights, and educational rights.

14. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 596
(1958).
15. Id.
16. Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 13, at 1323.
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C. Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment

1.

History v. Autonomy

The reason we care whether a right, natural or positive in nature, is
also a "fundamental" right is because a "fundamental" right is afforded
great Constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Fundamental rights analysis is the
primary means courts use to determine the meaning of the word "liberty"
in the Fourteenth AmendmentY A fundamental right can be found
either explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. The classic fundamental
rights include those natural rights enumerated in the Constitution,
including the right to vote. Other fundamental rights, not enumerated
but considered implicit in the Constitution, include the right to travel, 18
the right to direct your child's upbringing/ 9 the right to marry20 and an
expanding right to privacy, 21 which includes the right to bodily
integrity. 22 There are two chief methods of determining if an implicit
right in question is fundamental. The first is an historical approach,
analyzing the history and tradition behind the exercise and effect of the
right. The second approach is a more open autonomy approach
exemplified by decisions like Griswolcf 3 and, more recently, Lawrence.Z4
Here the analysis focuses on the importance of the right to the
individual. 25
Under the first approach, the fundamentalality analysis focuses on
history and tradition. The word "fundamental" does not carry the
dictionary definition, but is a term of art. "Fundamental" does not mean
important, basic or necessary. 26 Most rights deemed fundamental are
usually also important, basic and necessary. However, being important,

17. The relevant wording of the Fourteenth Amendment is "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,§ I.
18. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,498 (1999).
19. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), overruled in part on other grounds, Abbott v.
Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 594-595 (D. Me. 1995).
20. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,383 (1978); Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967).
21. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
22. Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,847,851 (1992).
23. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Discussed infra this section, note 32.
24. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. Discussed infra this section, notes 36, 38.
25. Infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
26. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30.
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basic or necessary does not automatically mean a right is fundamental. 27
For example, food is a critical necessity, but there is no positive right that
requires the government to provide food for all citizens.
A fundamental right is primarily a right which is "'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition,"' 28 and is part of "the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty ... which lie[s] at the base of all of our civil and
political institutions." 29 The Supreme Court has also required the right in
question to have been protected. 3° For example, being "long recognized
at common law" 31 is one way to show that the right is necessary to a just
government. Fundamental rights thus appeal to natural law concepts of
the way things ought to be, while at the same time, by considering history
and tradition, pay deference to the positive law aspects of that history and
tradition.
The second approach to determining the fundamentality of implicit
constitutional rights involves an inquiry into the importance of the right
to the autonomy of the individual. In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance ... creat[ing] zones of privacy." 32 In other
words, the explicit guarantees of the Constitution outline the general
concepts of the rights to be protected, and the prime right not explicitly
enumerated but which can be reasonably inferred is the right to privacy,
or the right to the autonomy of the individual. This reasoning was
further expanded in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 33 where the Court stated, "It is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter." 34 The Court also stated, "At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life." 35 The Court explicitly relied on this type of

27. I d. at 33 ("[T]he central importance of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate
foundation for requiring the State to justifY its law by showing some compelling state interest.").
28. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality)). See also Reno v Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1 993) (Fundamental
liberty interests must be "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental." (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)).
29. Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325, 328 (1937) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Md., 395 U.S. 784, 794 ( 1969).
30. Michael H. v. GeraldD.,491 U.S.l!O, 122 (1989).
31. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
32. 381 U.S. at 484.
33. 505 U.S. 833.
34. !d. at 847.
35. Id. at 851.
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reasoning when invalidating Texas's law against homosexual sodomy in
Lawrence:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom. 36

This sort of analysis protects constitutional liberties that are important to
the individual determination of freedom. This current approach is more
flexible in determining what a fundamental right is. History may provide
a context, but the most relevant context is the present. 37 In fact, the
Court specifically rejected a historical approach in Lawrence, stating that
the "laws and traditions in the past half century are most relevant" 38 in
determining the nature of a fundamental right.

2.

Flexibility v. Stability

There is particular difficulty when the judiciary interprets social
issues involving important rights that are determined to be fundamental.
Important social issues tempt justices to base decisions on extraconstitutional considerations, inviting unpredictable interpretations of
the defining document of our nation. The Court gets involved in
enacting "Herbert Spencer's Social Sta[ tis] tics." 39
Constitutional
interpretation becomes unpredictable and almost legislative. 40 Worse, if
the Court gets it wrong, the only way to fix it is with a Constitutional
amendment or by the infrequent occurrence of the Court overruling
itself.
36. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-579.
37. Id. at 571-72.
38. Id.
39. Lochner v. N.Y.. 198 U.S. 45,75 (1905). (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled, Honeywell, Inc.
v. Minn. Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn., 110 F.3d 547, 554 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Cases of that era
frequently invalidated statutes that limited economic autonomy in a manner thought by the Court to
be unnecessary or unwise, but in more recent decisions, the Court plainly sees its role differently.");
and overruled, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("The doctrine that prevailed in
Lochner . .. that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the
legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been discarded."). But see Planned Parenthood of S.E.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992) (The Court states that the "privacy" and "liberty" analyses
are the substantive due process analysis purportedly discarded by Ferguson.)
40. Honeywell, 110 F. 3d at 554 ("'We do not sit as a super legislature to weigh the wisdom of
legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare."' (quoting
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Mo., 342 U.S. 421,423, {1952))).
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The Constitution should be a predictable guide for government
action. The definition of the various constitutional rights becomes
significant in determining the stability of constitutional interpretation
over time. Courts can act with confidence in areas that have been well
trod. But the newer, less well-defined aspects of a case presented to a
court should invite caution in judicial action. It takes time and
experimentation to see how certain rights affect political, social,
economic, familial, individual and legal aspects of society.
Thus, there is an ongoing tension between the need for constitutional
stability on one hand and flexibility on the other. An easily amended
constitution becomes unpredictable and looses the authority of history
and tradition. Rather than being something by which to measure state
action, a too-malleable constitution makes state action a high-stakes
gamble. Consequently, to protect the stability and integrity of the
Constitution, the amending procedures built into it are extremely
difficult and make it unlikely for any amendment to pass. On the other
hand, a constitution should not be a straightjacket, imprisoning the
future with restrictions from the past. It should be flexible and adaptable
to the times.
This difficult balancing act of stability and flexibility was
demonstrated in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections. 41 At one point
Justice Douglas stated, "In determining what lines are unconstitutionally
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of
equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed
catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of
fundamental rights." 42 This statement implies that the requirements of
both due process and equal protection will change over time. On the next
page Justice Douglas declared that the Court's conclusion "is founded not
on what we think governmental policy should be, but on what the Equal
Protection Clause requires." 43 This implies a built-in stability to the
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. But if the Court is the only
determiner of the changing meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, how
can any interpretation be based on anything other than what the Court
thinks governmental policy should be?
In his dissent, Justice Harlan pointed out the unsuitability of too

41. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Harperforms part of the background for subsequent federal and state
educational funding cases. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250 (Cal. 1971), superseded on other
grounds, Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 487 P.2d at 1249
(App. 4th Dist. 2002); Rodriquez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282-83 (W.D.
Tex. 1971) [hereinafter Rodriguez II].
42. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669.
43. I d. at 670.
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much judicial flexibility in constitutional analysis:
It is of course entirely fitting that legislatures should modify the law to

reflect such changes in popular attitudes. However, it is all wrong, in
my view, for the Court to adopt the political doctrines popularly
accepted at a particular moment of our history and to declare all others
to be irrational and invidious, barring them from the range of choice by
reasonably minded people acting through the political process. 44

Political processes are better fitted to determine issues upon which
reasonable people can reasonably disagree. If an outcome is inadequate, a
majority of the people can change the outcome to better fit the needs of
the time; the issue is not elevated to the level of constitutional debate, and
yet it is satisfactorily handled. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court
makes a determination of such a highly debatable Issue on ostensibly
constitutional principles, the outcome of which is insufficient, unless the
justices overturn themselves, only a supermajority of the people, through
a constitutional amendment, can remedy the situation. 45
3.

Levels of Constitutional Analysis

Because of the need to limit judges and send questions of legislative
importance to the political branches, courts have generally required a
showing that a right is fundamental, or that a suspect classification is
being used, before strictly scrutinizing a governmental action. Rights that
are not fundamental are subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny. The idea
behind these differing levels of scrutiny is that the judiciary should
involve itself only in matters where the individual right is such that it
would be a grave injustice for the majoritarian process to violate that
right. 46 If the right is fundamental, it is critical that the courts be able to
counter the will of the majority to protect the individual. Strict scrutiny is
also applied if the government uses a suspect classification, such as race
or gender. 47
Strict scrutiny requires that the regulation in question have a
compelling governmental interest as its end goal, and that the means

44. Id. at 686 (Harlan & Stewart, Jj., dissenting).
45. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 133, 178 (1803) ("So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If then the courts are to regard the constitution;
and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.")
46. Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623,622 (1887).
47. See Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303,307 (1879); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,75 (1971).
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used to achieve that end are narrowly tailored to accomplish it. 48 Narrow
tailoring means that the methods used must be necessary to the
accomplishment of the objective and there must not be any less
restrictive means possible to attain the end. 49 In other words, there must
be a tight fit between the means and the end. The government carries a
substantial burden in proving a tight fit between the means and the end.
In practice, the "necessary" prong of the strict scrutiny analysis can kill
almost any regulation because there are very few things that are
absolutely necessary to accomplish any goal. 5° There is always more than
one way to skin a cat. Thus, strict scrutiny is frequently lethal to a
governmental regulation.
Rational basis scrutiny, on the other hand, only requires that the
regulation be in furtherance of a legitimate, as opposed to compelling,
state interest, and that the means used are rationally related to the end
sought. 51 These two requirements are relatively easy for the government
to satisfy. Generally, if a regulation of a right is subject to rational basis
scrutiny, in all likelihood the regulation will survive. The person
challenging the governmental action carries the burden of disproving the
rationality of the action. 52
The consequence of identifying public education as a constitutionally
protected fundamental right is that any regulation of public education
would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The government, on both
state and federal levels, would be required each time to show that every
action taken regarding public education is necessary to accomplish the
goal of education. This leads to competing difficulties. First, it would
require the federal government to provide for and finance public
education, leading to many economic and social repercussions. Second,
combining the amorphous process of education with the stringent
requirements of strict scrutiny could hamstring the government's ability

48. See e.g. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) ("Accordingly, we have held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because
of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.").
49. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
50. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: a Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972) ("The Warren Court embraced a rigid two-tiered
attitude .... [Strict scrutiny] was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact.").
51. See e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) ("[T]he ... [statute] can hardly be
considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State.").
52. This description of a two-tiered system of judicial scrutiny oversimplifies the current
Supreme Court jurisprudence. In certain areas, such as gender discrimination, age discrimination
and sexual orientation, the Court does not adhere clearly to one standard or the other. Rather it
applies some form of mid-tier scrutiny.
See e.g. Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyan v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender
Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 185, 186 (2003).
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III. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION AND THE FEDERAL
TREATMENT OF EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS

From the beginning, America's leaders have stressed education's
importance. Thomas Jefferson drafted a plan by which the poor in
Virginia could receive the benefits of education. He stated,
Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people
alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories.
And to render even them safe, their minds must be improved to a
certain degree. This indeed is not all that is necessary, though it be
essentially necessary. An amendment of our [state] constitution must
here come in aid of the public education. 53
The purpose behind the schooling was to protect democratic
government. Jefferson also envisioned public education as a means of
socio-economic redistribution, benefiting not just the nation's political
health but also its social and economic aspects, as well as a means for
providing for individual improvement. 54
However, the federal government felt no compulsion to mandate
education, and though state constitutions contained clauses requiring
education for children, compulsory attendance was not a law. 55 In 1852,
Massachusetts was the first state to pass compulsory school attendance
laws. 56 Families were primarily responsible for the education of their
children. Families with sufficient resources would send their children to
private schools or tutor them at home. 57 Poor families could send their
children to government-sponsored schools, but attendance was not
mandatory. 58 In other words, decision-making power concerning a
child's education rested with the family. This concept is behind the
holdings in Meyer v. Nebraska 59 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 60
However, as compulsory school attendance laws became universal,

53. Thomas jefferson, The Works of Thomas Jefferson val. 4, 64 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., fed.
ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1904)).
54. Id.; Goldstein, supra n. 9 at 8.
55. Mark). Yudof et al., Educational Policy and the Law I (4th ed., West 2002).
56. Daniel ). Rose, Compulsory Education and Parent Rights: A Judicial Framework of
Analysis, 30 B.C. L. Rev. 861,868 (1989).
57. Yudof, supra n. 55, at 2.
58. Id. at I.
59. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. Discussed infra, this section, notes 75-78.
60. 268 U.S. 510,532 (1925). Discussed infra this section, notes 80-85.
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making education look more like a positive right, the decision-making
power shifted. For example, the presumption in Wisconsin v. Yoder'>~ was
enough against the parents' right to choose their child's education that
the holding had to be extremely narrow to apply practically only to the
Amish. 62
This concept of publicly funded compulsory education is relatively
new- approximately one hundred years old. 63 During the entire course
of this history, the states, and more precisely, the local school districts,
have been primarily responsible for funding education. States have also
been primarily responsible for making educational policy decisions.
Because of the newness of compulsory education and because of the
traditional competency of the states in handling education, it would be a
departure from historical analysis for a court to declare a federal
fundamental right to education.
Until recently, Congress has had little or nothing to do with the vast
majority of educational issues. This is largely due to constitutional
restrictions on the federal government's ability to act. The federal
government cannot act without authority explicitly granted to it by the
Constitution, and nothing in the Constitution explicitly delegates
educational authority to the federal government.
However, Congress is no stranger to educational policy issues and
such previous involvement may justify the creation of a federal right to
public education. Congress has shaped public education through the
authority of other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Spending
Clause64 and the Commerce Clause. 65 One hefty federal educational
directive is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 66
Congress mandated significant state action to equalize educational

61. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
62. Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 937,
992-93 (1996).
63. Rose, supra n. 56, at 868. It was not until 1983 that all fifty states and the District of
Columbia had compulsory education laws. Id.
64. Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education under the U.S.
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 550, 631
(1992).
65. However, Congress's ability to use the commerce clause as a means to regulate public
schools was effectively halted by U.S. v. Lopez, where the link between interstate commerce and gun
control at schools was too attenuated to allow Congress to pass a Gun-Free School Zones Act. 514
U.S. 549,567-68 (1995), superseded, U.S. v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1140 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The [Lopez]
Court's decision also relied on the absence of a jurisdictional element in the statute and the lack of
relevant congressional findings. While Lopez was pending review in the Supreme Court, Congress
amended [the statute] to include such findings." (internal footnotes omitted)).
66. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (2000).
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opportunity for the disabledY This action was done under the authority
of the Spending Clause, 68 yet is largely unfunded. 69 The IDEA creates a
positive federal fundamental right to public education, but only for those
who are disabled. Other examples of federal intervention in state public
education include desegregation requirements/ 0 and First Amendment
requirements of free speech, and free exercise and non-establishment of
religion. 71 Currently, the federal government is making a significant
foray into the educational policy sphere under the No Child Left Behind
Act (NCLB). 72 The actions together could serve as a justification for
establishing a federal fundamental right to public education, whether
under an historical or flexible-autonomy approach.
Some version of a right to education has long been recognized by the
Supreme Court. 73 Generally this right has been characterized as a natural
right held by parents to direct the upbringing and education of their
children. This means that traditionally, the responsibility and decisionmaking power for a child's education rested in the first instance with the
parent. It was not until the spread of compulsory education laws in the
early twentieth century that the assumption of responsibility began to
shift towards the state. 74
One of the earliest cases in which the Supreme Court dealt with a
right to education is Meyer v. Nebraska? 5 The Court struck down a
statute that prohibited teaching foreign languages before the eighth
grade. 76 The State's interest in acculturating its citizens did not outweigh
67. David Stewart, Expanding Remedies for IDEA Violations, 31 [.L. & Educ. 373,377 (2002).
68. Id. at 376-77.
69. Only approximately eight percent of IDEA mandates are paid for from Federal coffers.
The rest must be provided by the State. See 143 Cong. Rec. S4356 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement
of Sen. Gorton).
70. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), affd, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. l, 30 (1971) (bussing students a permissible remedy for creating
unitary school districts).
71. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987) (Act requiring balanced treatment
between evolution and creationism was an establishment of religion in violation of the l'irst
Amendment); Wallace v. ]ajfree, 472 U.S. 38, 41-42, 61 (1985) (Daily period of silence in public
schools for meditation or voluntary prayer was an endorsement of religion in violation of the First
Amendment); W. Va. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (students with religious objections not
required to salute the flag).
72. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301 et seq. (2000).
73. See Meyer, 252 U.S. 390, Brown, 347 U.S. 483, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.
74. Rose, supra n. 56, at 867.
75. 262 U.S. 390.
76. Id. at 399 (explaining that "liberty ... denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"). This case

274

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2005

the combined interests of parents in directing the education of their
children, teachers in pursuing their professions, and children in
acquiring knowledge. 77 The Court hinted at the fundamentality of these
educational rights by stating "the individual has certain fundamental
rights which must be respected." 78 However, the case was decided under
rational basis scrutiny and failed to establish conclusively that either
parents or students hold a fundamental right to public education. 79
The next landmark case in which the Court considered educational
rights was Pierce. 80 In Pierce, the Court struck down a statute requiring
that all students attend public schools. 81 Creating such a duty on the
government would also create the commensurate right to demand public
education. 82 The statute was struck down under rational basis scrutiny
based explicitly on the reasoning in Meyer. 83 The Court's language
strongly stated that the State could not constitutionally compel students
to attend public schools, and that to do so violated the parents' right to
direct their children's education. 84 As in Meyer, the right to education
was not considered to be held by students alone, but rather is a right held
jointly by parents and teachers. 85 Consequently, the case does not answer
the question of whether students could demand a public education from
the State.
Brown v. Board of Education 86 is a milestone in the history of
constitutional law. In this case, Justice Warren used sweeping language to
describe what public education is:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local
forms part of the background for expanding the definitions of "liberty" and "privacy" beyond what is
explicitly written in the Constitution.
77. Id. at 401.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 403.
80. 268 U.S. 510.
81. Id. at 530, 534-35.
82. See e.g. McDuffy v. Sec. of the Exec. Off of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Mass. 1993)
(holding that a legal duty exists under the Massachusetts Constitution to provide an adequate public
education).
83. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 532, 534-35. However, the fundamentality of the parents' right to direct their
children's education has been undermined by recent cases involving home schooling and
compulsory attendance laws. See Null v. Bd. of Educ. of County of Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 937, 939
(S.D.W. Va. 1993) (Parents, though they have an interest, have no fundamental right to home school
children such that strict scrutiny is invoked when the parents challenge a law that removes students
from home schools if the students did not adequately pass a standardized test.); Hanson v. Cushman,
490 F. Supp. 109, 114 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (Parents' interest in directing their children's education is
not a fundamental right which invokes strict scrutiny.).
86. 347 u.s. 483.
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governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms. 87
However, the question in this case was race-based classification, not the
nature of a right to education. 88 Furthermore, equal protection analysis is
inherently relative. Brown can only mean that when a state chooses to act
by providing education, it must provide it on equal terms. 89 This does
not actually require a state to provide public education, and therefore
does not establish a fundamental right to public education.
More recently the question of whether public education is a
fundamental right has come up largely under equal protection analyses of
state funding schemes. The background of these equal protection cases
begins with a voting rights case, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections. 90
This case is important in at least two aspects relevant to the subsequent
educational funding cases: the reasoning used to establish first, the
fundamental right to vote, 91 and second, that wealth may be a suspect
classification. 92
In Harper, a poll tax was held unconstitutional as violating a citizen's
fundamental right to vote. 93 The right to vote was held to be
fundamental because it is "preservative of other basic civil and political
rights" 94 Without the right to vote, a person not only would be denied
first amendment rights of expression in the political arena, but also
would lose the ability to use political processes to protect other rights. 95
87. Id. at 493.
88. Id.
89. Id. ("Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.").
90. 383 u.s. 663.
91. Id. at 667.
92. Id. at 668 ("Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate
intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth . . . are traditionally
disfavored.")
93. Id.
94. Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,561-62 (1964)).
95. See id.
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Perhaps the Court's most unique and difficult holding is that wealth
is a suspect classification which states are not justified using in relation to
fundamental rights. 96 However, wealth classifications are necessarily
used in determining such things as welfare benefits and taxes. Subjecting
a state to strict scrutiny in making these decisions could hamstring its
ability to act at all, involving courts in the details of administering areas
that they are ill-equipped to handle. 97
However, these fears are unlikely to be realized soon. The Court has
backed away from strict scrutiny of economic issues, including wealth
classifications, 98 and has also curtailed considering government
entitlements as liberty or property interests. 99 However, it appears that
this change in reasoning is based more on practicality than on
constitutional analysis. If providing welfare benefits were required due to
a fundamental liberty or property right classification, the State would be
severely strained providing for what could become a flood of demands on
its resources. If there is not a limit to what is considered a fundamental
right, individual property interests and majority democratic rule would
fall to pieces. Shades of Marxism and communism dance in the shadows
of ever-expanding fundamental rights.
It is important to note several distinctions between Harper and the
educational funding cases that follow. Harper deals with a unique state
power to tax, and a well-established inherent right that only the
government has to tax. 10° Furthermore, U.S. citizens have long held the
franchise to vote. 101 The question in Harper was not the existence of a
fundamental right to vote, 102 rather, the question was whether state action
inhibited the ability of citizens to exercise the already established right to
vote. 103 In contrast, education is not a uniquely state prerogative and
states rarely act to prohibit access to education. 104

96. !d. at 668.
97. Infra nn. 160-164 (discussing the problems with classifying education as a fundamental
right).
98. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) ("'tis enough that the State's action be
rationally based.").
99. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78
(1972) (concepts of liberty and property interests severely limited when determining the extent of
procedural due process required).
100. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
101. Id. at 667 (referring to "'the political franchise of voting,"' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 ( 1886).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 668.
104. There have been school districts which closed down in an effort to remain racially
segregated. However, Courts required the districts to re-open, in as much as such action was illegally
discriminatory. See A. E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia vol. 2, 883-84
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Another important distinction between Harper and subsequent
public education cases is that the right to vote is purely political and is
inherent in a democratic government. The right to vote demands nothing
more of the government except that a democracy exist. 105 In contrast,
public education would not exist without significant state resource input.
Furthermore, it is difficult to delineate a right to public education as a
political right, civil right or human right. It is an amalgamation of them
all.

A. Serrano v. Priest
This case, though a state court case, forms the background for the
Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez. 106 In Serrano v. Priest, 107 the
California Supreme Court decided under an equal protection analysis
that California's public school financing provisiOns were
unconstitutional. 108 In the process, it declared that public education was
a fundamental right 109 and that wealth is a suspect classification. 110
At the time in California, there were two major sources of funding:
the local property taxes (providing the majority of the funds) and aid
from the State School Fund. 111 The total raw dollar amount available for
education could be significantly more in property-rich districts than in
property-poor districts, even if the rich districts tax at a significantly
lower rate. 112
Parents in a property poor district of Los Angeles brought a class
action suit, representing "all public school pupils in California, 'except
children in that school district, the identity of which is presently
unknown, which school district affords the greatest educational
opportunity of all school districts within California."' 113 The listing of the
members of this class shows that the plaintiffs weren't seeking merely

(U. Press ofVa. 1974).
I 05. And the ability to interpret various forms of chads.
106. 411 U.S. at 18-19 n. 48.
107. 487 P.2d 1241.
108. Jd. at 1263.
109. Jd. at 1258.
110. Jd. at 1250.
Ill. Jd. at 1246.
112. Jd. It is interesting to note the assumption that putting more money into education is
some sort of guarantee that the education will be better. In broad outlines this may be true, but
throwing more money at an issue is no hard guarantee of improving any particular problem.
Furthermore, an area's income per family is not necessarily the only determiner of the tax base.
Industrial areas surrounded by neighborhoods of the lower socio-economic strata can have a
significant tax base by virtue of the tax levied on the industrial property.
113. !d. at 1244.
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that the State fulfill some basement definition of an adequate education.
They were demanding that the State provide the best possible education
to all students by equalizing and maximizing state funding of education.
The court held that the financing system based upon local property
taxes was not necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest. 114
While the court decided the issue using strict scrutiny, the court
acknowledged that the contention that education is "a fundamental
interest which may not be conditioned on wealth" was without direct
support. 115 The only support was tangential: dicta in Shapiro v.
Thompson 116 indicated that wealth discrimination in public education
would be unconstitutional. 117 Also, the Fifth Circuit had considered the
issue of whether public education is a fundamental right, but avoided
defining education as a fundamental right by deciding the matters under
rational basis scrutiny. 118
There are further difficulties not noted by this court in striking down
such a funding scheme as a violation of equal protection. One is that
there must be purposeful discrimination in order to violate equal
protection. 119 However, because the local property tax system has been
used almost universally to fund public education, 120 such purposeful
discrimination is hard to prove.
After noting the "twin themes of the importance of education to the
individual and to society," 121 the court listed five reasons why education
is a fundamental right. First, education is "essential in maintaining ...
'free enterprise democracy' -that is, preserving an individual's
opportunity to compete successfully in the economic marketplace, despite

114. Id. at 1263.
115. Id. at 1255.
116. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part, Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 827 {1991) (The
Supreme Court reversed its prior holding regarding "the admission of victim impact evidence and
prosecutorial argument on that subject," which is not discussed in this paper.).
117. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1255 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633) ("We recognize that a State
has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to
limit its expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any other program. But a
State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. It
could not, for example, reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children from its
schools.").
118. Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The equal protection argument
advanced by plaintiffs is the crux of the case. Noting that lines drawn on wealth are suspect and that
we are here dealing with interests which may well be deemed fundamental, we cannot say that there
is no reasonably arguable theory of equal protection which would support a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs" (internal citations omitted)).
119. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,240 (1976).
120. Patt, supra n. 10, at 551.
121. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1257.
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a disadvantaged background." 122 This hearkens back to the reasoning
from Harper: the right to education is preservative of other rights. 123
The second, third, and fourth reasons why the court considered
education as a fundamental interest all deal with the depth and breadth
of education's effect on each individual in society. These reasons hearken
back to the U.S. Supreme Court's language in Brown. 124 Each reason
compared education with other government services, such as welfare, fire
and police protection, and garbage collection. 125 The second reason was
that everyone benefits from education. 126 Third, public education occurs
over a continuous span of ten to thirteen years. 127 The fourth reason was
that education "is unmatched in the extent to which it molds the
personality of the youth of society." 128 In contrast to these reasons, other
government services may not be called upon by citizens, are intermittent
in their operation, and are "essentially neutral in their effect on the
individual psyche." 129
Finally, the court determined that education was a fundamental
interest because the State had made attendance compulsory. 130
Furthermore, the compulsoriness was not limited to just requiring
attendance at any school: a student must attend a particular district or
school, unless the family has the resources to send the student to a
private school. 131 This made poorer students take on '"the complexion
of ... prisoner[s], complete with a minimum sentence of 12 years."' 132
The State attempted to show that using local property taxes is
narrowly tailored to the goal of educating children, claiming that local
property taxes promoted a compelling interest in promoting local control
of public education. 133 The court rejected this on two grounds. First,
decision-making power could still lie with the districts, regardless of the
funding scheme. 134 Second, local control means little if limited tax
resources means limited educational choice. As the court put it, "So long

122. /d. at 1258-59 (emphasis added).
123. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 667.
124. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
125. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1259.
126. Jd.
127. Id.
128. !d.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1259 (quoting john E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable
Constitutional Test of State Financial Structures 57 Cal. L. Rev. 305,388 (1969)).
133. Id. at 1260.
134. /d.
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as the assessed valuation within a district's boundaries is a major
determinant of how much it can spend for its schools, only a district with
a large tax base will be truly able to decide how much it really cares about
education." 135
And so the court required the State to equalize all funds across the
State assuming the result would be increased funding from the State's
deep pocket. 136 However, centralizing school financing through judicial
decree reduces property owners' incentives to pay for public schooling
and limits legislative ability to appropriately respond to public demand
for decreased taxes. 137
After Serrano took effect, the California
Legislature was faced with a tax reduction measure known as Proposition
13, which had the effect of reducing educational funding statewide. The
legislature was effectively restricted from acting to protect educational
spending when taxpayers were demanding a reduction in total
spending. 138 Ultimately, this led to "starv[ation of] the public sector,
[with] school funding [as a] major victim." 139 In contrast, when local
property taxes support schools, taxpayers self-interest in the
"capitalization of the benefits of education into individual property
values makes it rational for . . . [everyone] to offer support for
education." 140
Note the shift in the assumption of who holds the decision-making
power. In the previous education cases, the parents were the primary
decision makers. The right in question was clearly the parents' right to
direct their child's education. In this case, the right in question is not as
clear. It seems to be more of an amalgamation of a child's right to be
educated in some manner, and the state's responsibility to provide that
education. Parents are calling upon the state to act, rather than
petitioning for the state to stop acting. Rather than the parents making a
decision that directly affects their child, the parents are affecting their
children indirectly through the agency of the state. The state's power over
children is actually increased, for good or ill.
B. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

In Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with a factual
situation similar to that in Serrano, and reached a decidedly different

135. Id.
136. William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 j.L. & Pol. 607,619 (1996).
137. See id.
138. Id. at 608-609.
139. Id. at 609.
140. Id. at 620.
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outcome. 141 The Rodriguez Court unequivocally determined that public
education is not a federal fundamental right. 142
Just as in California, public school funds in San Antonio came largely
from local property taxes and a supplementary state fund. 143 Plaintiffs
were from Edgewood Independent School District, whose average
assessed property value per pupil was the lowest in San Antonio,
$5,960. 144 In comparison, the Alamo Heights Independent School
District, the most affluent district in the metropolitan area, had an
assessed property value per pupil of more than $49,000. 145 Despite Texas'
efforts to equalize educational funding, there was still a $238-per-pupil
difference in expenditures. 146 To worsen the rub of the disparity, the
taxpayers in the poor Edgewood District paid an equalized tax rate of
$1.05 per $100 of assessed property, as opposed to only $.85 per $100 in
Alamo Heights. 147
Based on reasoning from Harper and Serrano, the Federal District
Court found that the dual system of financing public schools violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 148 The Supreme Court rejected Harper 149 and
Serrano 150 as controlling precedent. Harper dealt with restrictions on the
right to vote, not with disparities in disbursement of government
entitlements. 151 Furthermore, there was no clearly defined class of people
in Rodriguez who could be considered discriminated against on the basis
of wealth. 152 It could have been people who fell below some specific level
of poverty, or people who were generally more poor than others, or those
who lived in a poor district, regardless of their actual income. 153 Justice
Powell pointed out that the "relative-rather than absolute-nature of

141. 411 U.S. 1.
142. Id. at 35.
143. Id. at 9-10. Federal funds were also available, but did not amount to enough to be
considered as significantly ameliorating the disparities. Id. at 12 n. 32.
144. Id. at 12.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 13.
147. Id. at 12-13.
148. Id. at 16 ("Finding that wealth is a "suspect" classification ... , the District Court held that
the Texas system could be sustained only if the State could show that it was premised upon some
compelling state interest."). "Serrano convincingly analyzes discussions regarding the suspect nature
of classifications based on wealth." Rodriguez II, 337 F. Supp. at 281. "Among the authorities relied
upon to support the ... conclusion 'that lines drawn on wealth are suspect' is Harper." Id. at 282
(quoting Harper, 383 U.S. at 668).
149. Id. at 18.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18-19.
Id. at 34-36.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
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the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence." 154 The plaintiffs
were claiming a deprivation, not because the State was actually depriving,
but because it was giving more to one group than to another. 155 The
Court found that the relativity of this argument undercut its strength,
particularly as no one claimed that any students were actually being
deprived of an education. 156
This was an unexpected position for an equal protection analysis
because equal protection concepts are inherently relative. Justice
Marshall in his dissent pointed this out: "The Equal Protection Clause is
not addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable
inequalities of state action. It mandates nothing less than that 'all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' 157
However, because of "the absence of any evidence that the financing
system discriminates against any definable category of 'poor' people or
that it results in the absolute deprivation of education," 158 and because
"[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none
of the traditional indicia of suspectness," the Court did not apply strict
scrutiny. 159
The Court then went on to consider whether education is a
fundamental right, using the classic historical approach. After noting the
undeniable importance of education, Justice Powell noted "the
importance of a service performed by the State does not determine
whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination
under the Equal Protection Clause." 16° Conceivably every State action
could have an important effect on citizens. Courts should not make "ad
hoc determination[s] as to the social or economic importance" of a
right. 161 If a court's determination of "importance" were the only criteria
on which to determine whether the right affected is a constitutional or
fundamental right, then nearly all State action would be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny, turning the judiciary into a "'super-legislature. "' 162

154. !d. at 19.
155. Id. at 15.
156. ld. at25,36-37.
157. ld. at 89 (Marshall,). dissenting) (quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Va., 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)).
158. Id. at 25.
159. Id. at 28. The traditional indicia of a suspect classification which plaintiffs lacked are, "the
class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." Id.
160. Id. at 30.
161. Id. at 32.
162. I d. at 31 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 655 (Harlan,)., dissenting)).
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Rather, equal protection analysis must be limited to those rights that are
established either explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. 163 As Justice
Powell pointed out, "It is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws." 164 Even though food, shelter, clothing and a job
are all extremely important, the courts have refused to depart from
normal modes of analysis of legislative classifications involving socioeconomic questions. 165
The Court stated that the question of whether education is a
fundamental right could only be answered by determining if it is a right
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 166 Obviously,
there is nothing about education explicit in the Constitution. An
argument can be made that education becomes a "fundamental political
right" implicit in the Constitution as it is "preservative of all rights." 167
The appellees in Rodriguez reasoned that without proper education,
citizens are unable to meaningfully participate in the political process. 168
They argued that there is a "nexus between speech and education" and
that without the ability to effectively communicate with others, the right
to free speech is meaningless. 169 Furthermore, if a person is uneducated,
their right to vote is not likely to benefit either that person or society in
general. 170 The Court rejected these arguments, stating that it
[has] never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to
guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most
informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable goals of a system
of freedom of expression and of a representative form of government is
not to be doubted. These are indeed goals to be pursued by a people
whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interference.

163. Id. at 33.
164. Id.
165. ]ejferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) ("So long as [the State's] judgments are
rational, and not invidious, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy
are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket."); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971)
(applying rational basis scrutiny for "a statutory classification in the area of social welfare"); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (Court did not apply strict scrutiny even though it found that
"welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care."),
superseded, St. ex rei. K.M. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 575 S.E.2d 393, 402 (W.
Va. 2002) (The specific holding that "cash assistance cannot be terminated prior to a due process
hearing" was superseded when "Congress made sweeping changes to this area of the law," but this is
not addressed in this paper.).
166. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33 (1973).
167. Cf Harper, 383 U.S. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370).
168. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36.
169. Id. at 35.
170. Id. at 35-36.
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But they are not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into
171
otherwise legitimate state activities.

The majority, after determining that strict scrutiny would be
inappropriate, went on to state what has been called "the un-held
holding" of Rodriguez. 172 First, the Court recognized the possibility that
"some identifiable quantum of education" 173 may be required to protect
these established Constitutional rights. Second, whatever that quantum
might be, it certainly existed in Texas at that time, even in the poorest
districts. 174 This actually leaves open the question of whether some level
of education is a fundamental right. Once a state provides education, is
there a minimum level required that constitutes a fundamental right?
Though the Court declined to exercise strict scrutiny because it found
that education is not a federal fundamental right, one way to interpret
Rodriguez is that the Court declined to exercise strict scrutiny because the
fundamental interest in education was not implicated by the situation.
However, the dissent made the point that there are rights the Court
has found that are not explicit in the Constitution. 175 Justice Marshall
argued for a less restrictive approach to constitutional analysis than the
strict textualism adopted by the majority in Rodriguez. In Marshall's
view, as the "nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the
nonconstitutional interest draws closer," then that interest becomes more
fundamental and judicial scrutiny should increase commensurately. 176
This reasoning is in line with cases establishing the right to procreate/ 77
the right to privacy, 178 the right to vote, 179 and the right to appeal a
criminal conviction. 180

C. Plyler v. Doe
The debate over whether education is a fundamental right became
even more confusing after the outcome of Plyler v. Doe. 181 Texas was

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 36 (internal citations omitted).
Bitensky, supra n. 64, at 117.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 100 (Marshall,). dissenting).

176. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
177. Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
178. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
179. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-562.
180. Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ("a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to
provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all" but strict judicial scrutiny is still

applied).
181. Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
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denying children of illegal aliens entrance to public schools. 182 The Court
held that this violated equal protection, even though the children were
not citizens of the United States with the constitutional guarantees that
follow from such citizenship. 183 The reasoning was not based on the
fundamentality of the right to education. Rather, the legislation failed
because the classification based on citizenship status did not further an
important state interest-there is no rational basis on which to deny any
child an education. 184 Essentially, the court dealt with the practical issue
of the cost of education to governments. Not educating a child is more
expensive than dealing with an un-educated adult, whether the adult is a
citizen or not.
But where does that leave us? There is no federal fundamental right
to public education, but no child can rationally be denied an education.
Is there any way to reconcile these seeming inconsistencies? Is there
some fundamental right to a minimally adequate education? And if so,
how is it to be protected?
IV. STATE JUDICIARIES' TREATMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC
EDUCATION AFTER RODRIGUEZ

Based on their own constitutions, the states have generally been more
welcoming to claims of education as a fundamental right. While the
federal constitution does not explicitly mention education, most state
constitutions do put an affirmative duty on the state to provide
education. 185 After failing to establish a federal fundamental right to
education in Rodriguez, litigators and reformers turned to the education
provisions in state constitutions with some success. 186
A classic case in this effort comes out of Kentucky: Rose v. Council for
Better Education. 187 This was another school funding case where the
plaintiffs were alleging an unconstitutional disparity. 188 This time
however, the constitution in question was the Kentucky Constitution.
The Kentucky court interpreted their constitution as creating a state
fundamental right to education. 189 Furthermore, the court outlined a
definition of a minimally adequate education, which has since become a

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

!d. at 205.
!d. at 210, 230.
Id. at 230.
Walsh, supra n. 1, at 281.
Patt, supra n. 10, at 556.
790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 206.
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guidepost for subsequent cases:
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each
and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of
economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his
or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to
enable each child to choose and pursue work intelligently; and (vii)
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding
states, in academics or in the job market. 190
This type of adequacy argument has taken the stage after the failure of
the more overt equal protection claims. 191
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that equal access to
participation in the state public school system is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the state constitutional provisions and "protected by
considerations of procedural due process." 192 Likewise, Connecticut's
Supreme Court found that whatever equal protection test is applied, "in
Connecticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any
infringement of that right must be strictly scrutinized." 193
West
Virginia's Supreme Court held that mandatory requirements of a
'"thorough and efficient system of free schools,'" found in the West
Virginia Constitution, make education a fundamental, constitutional
right. 194
Similarly, New Jersey's Supreme Court held that its
constitution's guarantee of a "thorough and efficient system of public
schooling" must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity

190. Id. at 212.
191. Pall, supra n. 10, at 556.
192. Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. ofEduc., 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (N.C. 1980). But see Britt v. N.C.
State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432, 436-37 (N.C. App. 1987) (State constitutional mandate that "equal
opportunities shall be provided for all students," ld. at 436, does not confer upon "each student in
the State ... a fundamental right to an education substantially equal to that enjoyed by every other
student in the State," Id. at 434, but rather, only means that all students were entitled to "full
participation in ... public schools, regardless of race or other classification;" Id. at 436, thus,
disparity in educational opportunities in counties with large tax base as opposed to those in counties
with small tax base did not result in constitutional violation.).
193. Horton v Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,373 (Conn. 1977).
194. Pauley v Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,878 (W.Va. 1979) (quoting theW. Va. Const. art. 12 § 1).
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which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role
as a citizen and as competitor in the labor market. 195
Some states do not declare a strong fundamental right to education.
Rather they cast it as a substantial right. A substantial right is afforded
more constitutional protection than that provided by rational basis
scrutiny, yet does not trigger the more stringent requirements of strict
scrutiny. 1Y6 For example, in New York, when the state undertakes to
provide free education to all students, "it must 'recognize a student's
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest,"'
though not a fundamental right. 197 Such a property interest is protected
by the due process clause. 198 A federal district court in Utah, interpreting
the Utah State Constitution, stopped short of creating a fundamental
right to education, but held that the state has a duty to teach children
living on Native American reservations. 199 This holding is in line with
the reasoning of Plyler, that once the state has chosen to provide
education it cannot rationally deny children from receiving it. 200 Perhaps
a reason these state courts hold back from declaring education as a
fundamental right stems from utilitarian concerns-state coffers are
limited. Or, perhaps the judiciaries of these states feel institutionally
incompetent to create and enforce educational policy, leaving it to the
political branches.
While many state courts have held in favor of either a fundamental
or substantial right to education, some have not. The Illinois Supreme
Court reasoned that the state compulsory education laws, which arguably
restrict physical liberty, impose no duty under the federal or Illinois Due
Process Clauses to provide students with a minimally safe and adequate
education. 201 Nebraska interpreted the education provision in its state
constitution in such a way that despite the explicit enumeration of
education, the court had no power to enforce it. The provision was not
self-executing because it was directed only to the legislature. 202
195. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273,295 (N.j. 1973). See also Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141,
149 (Wis. 1976) (Equal opportunity for education as defined by state constitution is a fundamental
right.).
196. In re Jessup, 379 N.Y.S.2d 626,632 (Fam. Ct. 1975)
197. !d. (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,574 (1975)).
198. Id.
199. Meyers ex rei Meyers v. Bd. of Educ., 905 F.Supp. 1544, 1568 (D. Utah 1995). The Utah
Constitution provides that "The Legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of
the state's education systems including: (a) a public education system, which shall be open to all
children of the state; and (b) a higher education system. Both systems shall be free from sectarian
control." Utah Con st. art. I 0, § 1.
200. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
201. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ill. 1999).
202. St. ex rei. Shineman v. Bd. ofEduc., 42 N.W.2d 168,170 (Neb. 1950).
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Some may view this lack of state constitutional protection as an
inexcusable harm to children. Perhaps it is. But the range of response
which states demonstrate is part of the strength of federalism. States can
more freely experiment with varying solutions to multifaceted problems.
The educational process is highly individualized and organic and does
not lend itself well to centralized dictation. Experimentation across many
states is desirable for determining best practices. There may be losses and
harms in a number of states, but at least those harms would be limited to
those states rather than spread across the entire Union.
V. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A SUFFICIENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND
PRACTICAL BASIS TO ESTABLISH A FEDERAL FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
PUBLIC EDUCATION?

Experience teaches us that formal education is good for individuals
and society. The existence of formal education is the way things ought to
be-is the natural law. But in order for education to be provided on a
broad, society-wide scale, positive law must be created. 203 The federal
judiciary has determined that the federal constitution does not create the
positive law that protects educational rights. 204 However, current
Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates a change in the winds. State
judiciaries, analyzing constitutions with specific educational guarantees
have come out largely in favor of a fundamental right to education,
though not unanimously so. 205
Often lost in all the debate is the question of what government
structure is best suited to make decisions regarding the funding,
provision and superintendence of education. On one level, all agree
regarding the importance of education. But is the federal government
best suited to deal with educational policy issues? Are the state
governments? What is the role of the judiciary in creating and enforcing
the positive law aspects of educational policy?
Using the analytical approach of Lawrence, 206 it is possible to argue
for a federal fundamental right to education. Education is critical to each
individual. The nature of our economy is now such that a citizen can
hardly exist without an education. In the past, this was not so. Now,
without an education, a citizen is both economically and politically
vulnerable. The trend across the state governments is to protect the right

203. See supra Section II(B) (discussing natural law and positivism).
204. See supra Section Ill(B) (discussing Rodriguez).
205. See supra Section IV (discussing state education cases).
206. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-579.
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to education. 207 And education is preservative of other rights. This
reasoning, rejected in Rodriguez, 208 gains strength after Lawrence. 209 After
all, it is rather absurd for our Constitution to ignore a child's right to
education while protecting an adult's right to private sexual behavior.
These arguments are only strengthened by the historical importance of
education.
Though there has never been an outright positive right to education,
there are several federal actions that indicate its existence. Congress has a
created a right to education for those with disabilities. 210 The Supreme
Court has consistently held for the parents' right to direct the education
of their children. And even Rodriguez did not absolutely leave out the
possibility of a right to education. 211
Yet if public education is considered a federal fundamental right it
could embroil the federal judiciary in administrative educational issues.
A fundamental right should invoke strict scrutiny. 212 Strict scrutiny
means that any governmental regulation must be narrowly tailored to
accomplish a compelling interest. Few regulations survive such analysis.
So any educational policy that anyone would care to litigate would most
likely be struck down by the court. The State could not accurately predict
how to create educational policy. The difficulties and costs associated
with litigation could harm educational processes. Courts would have to
depend upon mounds of sociology, rather than legal or constitutional
principles, in order to make decisions. The judiciary could be forced to
expound the minutest details of educational policy.
Missouri v. fenkins 213 is an example of what can happen when the
judiciary takes on educational policy issues. The federal district court was
attempting to enforce desegregation laws. By the time the issue reached
the U.S. Supreme Court, the federal district court judge was ordering
salary increases, ordering funding of educational programs, approving
facility improvements and otherwise using judicial decrees to effect an
increased attractiveness of the district. The course of the litigation took
over eighteen years. A federal district court became mired in minute

207. Supra, nn. 186-19S (discussing state education cases).
208. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 3S ("Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution.").
209. Lawrence, S39 U.S. at S78-79 (referring to "the components of liberty" as worthy of
protection).
210. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.
211. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37 (acknowledging the possibility of a "quantum of education
[could be] ... constitutionally protected").
212. Supra Section II(C)(iii) (discussing strict scrutiny).
213. SIS U.S. 70 (199S).
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educational procedures, and the resulting cost of litigation. 214 However,
what was the district court to do when the political branches of the state
government were not desegregating the schools? The tension is difficult.
The traditional repository for educational policy-making power is
with the states. Such a federalist approach has the advantages of local
control and of allowing for experimentation. The complex issues
affecting educational processes and policies are not easily resolved.
Finding that public education is a federal fundamental right would
require the federal government to carry the responsibility to fund
education. 215 Centralized control from the federal government may not
be the best manner for controlling public education.
Perhaps the best approach, that respects federalism issues and the
competencies of the judiciary, while placing appropriate emphasis on the
importance of education is for the federal judiciary to state explicitly the
un-held holding of Rodriguez-that there is a right to some basic level of
education, and that the states must determine and enforce this level. 216
Such a finding would be in accord with natural law principles, that a right
to education does exist, 217 while avoiding embroiling the federal judiciary
in day to day educational procedural matters or incurring additional
federal funds. 218
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214. Id. at 75-80 (reciting the lengthy procedural history of the case).
215. See Bitensky, supra n. 64, at 632-33.
216. Supra nn. 172-174 and accompanying text.
217. Supra Section II(B) (discussing natural law and positivism).
218. Jenkins, SIS U.S. 75-80 (discussing the judiciary problems of enforcing desegregation
provisions in a Missouri School District).

